ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we explore the vulnerability of critical infrastructure by extrapolating from Ozment and Schecter's examination of the nature of cyber security with respect to time (Ozment and Schechter, 2006) . Specifically, we aim to evaluate whether electric grids are becoming more vulnerable or more secure. We also identify possible threats to grids' stable operation which heretofore have not been clearly articulated, and offer potential avenues for enhancing the resilience of such systems. We adopt a hindcast approach to analyzing historical case studies that
In section 2, we begin by providing context on the nature of electric grids as both vital components of critical infrastructure and complex systems that are subject to cascading failure. In section 3, we analyze historical case studies which bear relevance to critical infrastructure protection efforts, namely the French defense against German invasion in World War II, the United States' prohibition of alcohol in the early 20 th century, and allied efforts to combat improvised explosive devices in the 21 st century. In section 4, we go on to discuss the origins and significance of the IMD as a threat to critical infrastructure and evaluate trends in grid reliability.
Finally, in section 5 we introduce options for enhancing the resilience of electric grids in response to threats like the IMD, we highlight areas for future work in section 6, and conclude in section VII.
ELECTRIC GRID SYSTEMS, COMPLEXITY, AND THE POTENTIAL FOR CASCADING FAILURE
Critical infrastructure, and the electric grid system in particular, is a backbone of modern civilization. Societies around the world rely upon electricity to power a variety of devices upon which individuals and organizations have come to depend -from refrigerators to coffeemakers, tablets to high performance computing systems, and the entire Internet of Things (IOT) (Atzori et al., 2010) . However, how brittle is the digital physical ecosystem which powers this IOT?
While vast resources are invested towards the research and development of smaller, faster, and smarter technological devices, the question remains as to whether a comparable investment is being made towards the research and development of protective measures for the backbone upon which all of these devices and capabilities are dependent. The grid's vulnerability has long been recognized (Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1990 ) and events in the recent past such as the Northeast blackout in 2003 demonstrate the negative impact of power disruptions (Minkel, 2008) . However, while such developments have precipitated improvements to the grid, in light of the fact that as many as 3,236 power outages or disruptions occurred in North America in 2013 at a cost of $150 billion (Eaton, 2013) can we say that the system is truly resilient? Under normal operating conditions, the interconnected systems that enable the mosaic of constituent critical infrastructures, such as the electric grid, to function properly are fairly subject to a complex web (Albert et al., 2004) of interrelated and constantly fluctuating variables. Maintaining synchronization and stability between the nearly 15,000 energy generating facilities and across the hundreds of thousands of miles of transmission and distribution lines that make up the North American grid is no simple task for a system that operates at 60 cycles per second. Even basic variables, like energy supply and consumer demand are influenced by a host of contributing factors, from the market price of petroleum, to the efficiency of air conditioning (AC) units and other home appliances. Moving beyond this steady state of complexity, natural weather events, seismic activity (Oahu, 2006) 1 and human-induced change can all have an even greater destabilizing impact upon the functioning of the grid. Understanding the overall vulnerability of the grid system requires a detailed exploration of each system component; both in the context of its interactions with the rest of the system, and with the surrounding environment in which the system resides. Such exploration uncovers layers of increasing interrelation (Strogatz, 2001) to account for in the system's design. If strong winds knock down power lines, then putting up stronger poles (even with plastiques) will not suffice; after all, what if termites infest the new pole? If terrorists threaten to sabotage a transmission substation, then will building fences around the substation suffice? What if they fly an aluminum foil kite over the fence? In contrast to the vast and highly interconnected North American system, we pay particular attention to the grids of the Hawaiian islands, which represent a somewhat unique case in light of their nature as truly islanded (i.e. independent) systems that are simultaneously home to strategically high-priority national security organizations and subject to a variety of extreme environmental events.
As an investigation of any major disaster will demonstrate, serious problems rarely arise in isolation from a solitary causal factor (Little, 2002; Jonkman et al., 2009; Bilham, 2010) . Rather, the complex interaction of many contributing variables has the potential to compound and build up pressure to exert stress on multiple weak points across a system simultaneously, or in close succession, that can produce chain reactions of devastating effects, or cascading failures, within a brittle (non-resilient) system. So, let us briefly explore the spectrum of cascading failures through two examples. First, suppose that severe weather conditions result in knocking out power within a service area containing a water treatment plant. Without power going to the water treatment plant, untreated sewage can flow into public waterways leaving beaches unsafe for tourism or other commercial activities, thereby compromising the economic vitality of the region 2 (i.e.
Waikiki Beach, Honolulu, Oahu (2006) ). Now, suppose an underwater earthquake triggers a tsunami that impacts the coast of a developed island nation, precipitating the meltdown of several 2011 Japan Tsunami and Fukushima Nuclear Accident).
While such examples illustrate the catastrophic potential of cascading failure, conducting forensic analysis of an extreme scale disaster, after the fact, is considerably easier than identifying the precipitating ingredients comprising the recipe of a perfect storm that has yet to come (e.g. an encore performance of the 1946 Aleutian Tsunami, which impacted the Hawaiian islands). We argue that a reorientation of CIP posture is in order which accepts the assumption of breach as an inevitable reality and incorporates resilient design into the grid's foundational architecture.
THE PROBLEM WITH HARDNESS: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE MAGINOT LINE, PROHIBITION, AND THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE?
With regards to CIP, the predominating trend tends to be towards -hardening‖, or adopting externally-focused measures to make individual components of the system more impermeable or resistant to failure. Examples include building fences or walls around transmission substations, sheathing power lines with thicker protective material (or placing them underground), and fortifying generation and transmission facilities in order to withstand more extreme weather or seismic events (Boggess et al., 2014) . While such measures do increase the grid's resilience against commonly occurring or easily predictable destabilizing events, they also bear similarity to the Maginot Line constructed by the French in the wake of the devastating trench warfare of the First World War. Composed of an 87-mile-long series of defensive fortifications, the Line was engineered to be a state-of-the-art security measure, replete with air-conditioned living quarters and an underground railway network (Allcorn, 2003) . Yet, for all the resources devoted to its construction, the Maginot Line was ineffective against the Blitzkrieg, whereby Nazi Panzer divisions maneuvered around the Line through the Ardennes Forest. The Allied defense strategy falsely assumed the Line guaranteed against any German invasion through France, so the preponderance of defense forces prepared for an attack from the North through Belgium. This assumption led to a crucial miscalculation, leaving the French with minimal adaptive capability to mount an alternative defense to the German advance, thus securing their defeat in the early stages of the Second World War. Similarly, hardening critical components of the electric grid with external protective measures like undergrounding, barbed wire, or reinforced concrete are effective in strengthening the shell surrounding the system, but do not increase the resilience of the system itself. Such measures cost money to implement and necessitate even more money to re-deploy as the terrain and circumstances change. Hardening measures are undoubtedly effective against the most likely or easily predicted destabilizing events (e.g. seasonal storms, unsophisticated vandals, etc.), but what about extreme events that are difficult to predict, and which, although rare in occurrence, yield devastating impact (e.g. Superstorms, high-magnitude seismic events, competent and determined terrorists, etc.)? While hardening critical doctors were permitted continued access to alcohol for medicinal purposes, it is clear that such privileged access was abused in order to imbibe alcohol for the purpose of intoxication, as is evidenced by the case of Alcoholics Anonymous co-founder Bob (1980) . Indeed, the complicity of public servants in the underground liquor trade presents an interesting parallel to the insider threat confronting CIP today, in that the very individuals entrusted to defend public safety are uniquely positioned to compromise it. The outcome of Prohibition demonstrates an important aspect of human nature that is relevant to the protection of the electric grid; given sufficient resources and motivation, an individual will find ways to achieve any desired end, regardless of the legal or physical barriers erected to prevent that end.
This fact is further evidenced by the case of improvised explosive devices (IED). Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, insurgents faced an allied force that was superior in training, organization, and equipment. In response, insurgents resorted to the widespread use of IEDs as one of their few strategic advantages; a destructive force that was relatively simple to produce and hard for the adversary to detect, or prevent against. More than a decade later, with over $20 billion spent (Russell, 2012 ) the efforts of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) and its partner agencies represent the largest publicly-funded wartime research and development program since the Manhattan Project. JIEDDO's work has saved lives, and enhanced the ability of the national security apparatus to cope with the adversary's primary weapon of choice.
However, the U.S. and its allies are unable to prevent IED attacks, and instead focus efforts on minimizing the devices' effectiveness (Zorpette, 2008) There is no singular solution to the problem of IEDs, and so a variety of methods have been developed to mitigate their negative impact, including tracking the production, sale, and movement of IED precursor materials (Chung et al., 2013) such as calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN), identifying the techniques and signatures of known IED producers, and developing methods for detecting and clearing planted devices. But, this does not definitively prevent the production and employment of IEDs, unless the US counter-IED strategy moving forward is to strictly acquire all available fertilizer worldwide in the hopes of preventing its further distribution. Meanwhile, events like the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013 (Kotz, 2013) demonstrate that IEDs are not a distant threat limited to combat zones, but rather are a proliferating global menace. JIEDDO has adopted a mixed-methods approach of simultaneously pursuing the human network of IED producers, coping with technical aspects of the device, and preparing personnel with training and education. Likewise, enhancing the resilience of the electric grid requires a mixed-methods approach that simultaneously strengthens external components of the system against routine disruptions, while also enabling the interior of the system to cope with extreme events.
As these historical examples demonstrate, implementing absolute defensive or preventive measures is fraught with difficulty, particularly when such measures are rigid, or inflexible.
Similar to the shortcomings of the Maginot Line and alcohol prohibition, efforts to harden the electric grid are compromised by an underlying specious assumption that all threats to a system's stable functioning can be identified and prevented. This assumption ignores the body of evidence that circumstances inexorably change, threats constantly evolve, the unlikely occurs, and that a static defense which proves effective at a singular moment will not remain effective in perpetuity.
As with the struggle to counter IEDs, it is useful to accept that destabilizing events will inevitably challenge the normal functioning of the grid, and therefore a variety of measures are required to respond adaptively to such events instead of trying to prevent them outright. In order to highlight this need for adaptation, let us consider the nature of human threats to a stable electric grid.
WHAT GOES AROUND COMES AROUND: GULF WAR ONE, THE GENESIS OF THE IMPROVISATIONAL MALIGNANT DEVICE, AND THE VULNERABILITY OF ELECTRIC GRIDS
legality of destroying civilian targets like the electric grid was under scrutiny, and military planners were compelled to seek methods of disabling the grid without destroying facilities outright. Therefore, in addition to the precision-guided munitions deployed to cripple Iraq's grid, the military also air dropped graphite wire and metal shards over Iraqi open-air transformer switching yards (Olsen, 2007; Bonsen, 2014) . Similar -soft bombs‖ were also deployed by U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces over Kosovo in 1999 in response to genocidal violence perpetrated by Serbian armed forces in the region. While they constituted vital components of strategic military air campaigns, these weapons were little more than metal wire and small graphite filaments dispersed from warheads, which established short circuits between critical pieces of transmission equipment, creating high-energy arcs and power surges that ultimately blacked out the targeted grid systems. Such a technique presents a strikingly profound irony; one of the most complex and costly pieces of a country's infrastructure can be compromised with relative ease by employing one of the most inexpensive and readily available materials at any supermarket or hardware store. Decades later, electric grids across the United States remain vulnerable to the same commodity.
While the soft bombs deployed over Iraq and Kosovo were delivered by rockets, it is not hard to conceive of a cost-efficient delivery method for the IMD. First, aluminum foil is a viable dispersion component, ideal for its conductivity and availability. Second, a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)s are available at physical and online retailers. Such devices could be piloted onto open air transformer switching yards with enough aluminum foil to generate similar short circuits as those achieved by smart bombs (Wargo et al., 2014) . Although the use of UAVs or drones for malicious purposes has been recognized, policy makers and regulatory agencies are challenged to keep pace with the rapidly evolving technology (Clarke and Bennett, 2014 ) thus making such devices ideal for employment as IMD components.
Given the simplicity with which it can be acquired and deployed to yield disruptive impact, we categorize such a threat as an improvisational malignant device (IMD). In contrast to the destructive capacity of the IED, an IMD is characterized by its capacity to disturb a system's normal functioning without completely destroying the system. The hallmark of the IMD is its ability to yield highly impactful results at a relatively low level of sophistication and cost. While natural disasters remain the most common cause of energy disruption, malicious activity targeting critical infrastructure like the grid is occurring with greater regularity and impact. For example, unidentified gunmen successfully disabled a San Jose substation more than a year ago with no suspects identified or motives understood as pertains to what the Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) called the -most significant incident of domestic terrorism involving the grid that has ever occurred‖ (Smith, 2013) . Indeed, the interconnected nature of the grid makes it vulnerable to targeted attack. This is particularly true of the critical components that make up the grid, such as the approximately 2,000 high voltage (HV) transformers, which comprise only 3% of transformers in the North American grid system, yet convey 60-70% of the grid's energy (Parfomak, 2014) . In fact, FERC researchers estimate that disabling as few as nine HV transmission substations would result in a nationwide blackout (Smith, 2014) .
In returning to the original question of whether the security of the electric grid is getting better or worse with age, we examined several relevant data sets. First, is the Electric Emergency Incident and Disturbance Report system, maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).
Utility operators are required to submit reports to DOE's Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration (ISER) Division any time that a power outage event meets certain threshold criteria 3 .
As depicted in figure 3 , analysis of the reports submitted since 2000 shows a steady increase in emergency and disturbance incidents from 32 incidents during the first year of reporting, to a maximum of 307 incidents in 2011. There was also a dramatic increase in incidents of attack and vandalism, from 3 such incidents in 2000, to 66 incidents in just 10 months of 2014. In contrast to the ISER reporting system, we also reviewed data collected by the power management firm Eaton, which compiles information on power outages based on news media reporting and personal accounts. Since just 2008, Eaton's reports show a 14% increase in the amount of annual power outage events, including a 58% increase in outages due to vandalism. Similarly, a 2012 study conducted by the Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory concluded that reported reliability of the North American electric power system has been decreasing at an average of 2% per year over the past ten years (Eto et al., 2012) . Increasing attacks on the electric grid coupled with decreasing operational reliability suggest that the overall security of the grid system is likely deteriorating with the passage of time. Rather than assuming that attacks on the grid can be comprehensively prevented, we must assume that attacks on the grid and other destabilizing events will inevitably occur. If preventing attack is no longer the objective, how does the protection architecture take shape? In addition to identifying what individual points within the grid system are most likely to be targeted due to their essential role in the system's overall operation, we must also look at how every component in the system interacts and can be leveraged to enhance the system's collective resilience.
Incorporating this resilience into the fabric of the grid system's design is not straight forward and will require thoughtful innovation and deliberate compromise with other system dimensions.
In addition to the necessity of increasing the grid's resilience and reliability, we cannot ignore the imperative for the grid to operate more efficiently by incorporating renewable energy sources.
However, renewable sources like solar and wind energy are intermittent, and thus inherently less stable than conventional sources like fossil fuel (Vittal, 2010) . This presents a paradox, and so a balance must be deliberately struck. In this vein, innovations like Enphase Energy's microinverter allows for more effective and stable integration of solar or photovoltaic (PV) energy generation into the grid. But, in Hawaii and elsewhere in the U.S., integrated PV power generation represents a fractional share of the overall energy portfolio, such that the advent of microinverters does not represent a sea-change improvement in grid operations. Similarly, advancements like Dominion Voltage Inc's (DVI) Edge platform, which leverages an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) or smart meters for voltage conservation and distribution automation will no doubt be a mainstay of the smart grid moving forward. However, Edge and other similar metering tools are consumption-centric and do not directly address either issues of system stability or the prevention and remediation of service disruption. In addition, the arrival of microinverters and AMI introduces new vulnerabilities into the grid due to their interconnected nature and susceptibility to being hacked or tampered with Jiang et al. (2014) . While microinverters and smart meters enhance the sophistication with which the grid operates, they also add layers of complexity and introduce new attack vectors for malicious actors.
There is no panacea or silver bullet solution for increasing the grid's resilience. The cost for achieving a fully functioning smart grid in the United States is estimated to be as high as $476 billion over the course of twenty years (EPRI, 2011). As system operators and regulators move forward on such a large investment, incorporating flexibility into the system's design will be critical in order to avoid the type of massive failure that our historical examples have demonstrated. The ability for a system to respond adaptively to changing circumstances is a hallmark of resilient functionality.
Some of the most promising progress in this regard is the increasingly granular level at which the state of the grid can be observed. The advent of phasor measurement unit (PMU) capability (Phadke, 2002) enables system operators to record multiple observations of operational grid variables in a single second, whereas the conventional supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system takes a single measurement every 2-5 seconds. In light of the fact that the grid operates at many cycles per second, such an increase in granularity facilitates a more precise understanding of the dynamics at work within the system. When multiple PMUs are linked, operators can benefit from a more comprehensive view of what is happening across the grid through wide area measurement systems (WAMS) (Phadke and Moraes, 2008) .
AREAS FOR FUTURE WORK
The ability to more quickly and accurately sense the occurrence of destabilizing events on the grid is a positive development, and one that will greatly enhance the grid's resilience as it is coupled with flexible response mechanisms distributed throughout the system to enable adaptive action (Amin, 2014) . Like an autonomic nervous system (ANS) for the grid, a computer-assisted dynamic fine-tuning or -sense and respond‖ capability will facilitate the timely identification of unstable conditions and enable automated corrective action. Just as the ANS functions below the level of consciousness to regulate basic bodily functions, a -sense and respond‖ capability will enable the grid to self-regulate by responding to disturbances faster than would be humanly possible. Still, extreme anomalies will undoubtedly require human intervention, and in such cases this advanced sensory and analytical capability will prioritize limited decision-making resources and drive better-informed action. The sense and respond paradigm will be further explored in future papers.
Although equipping the grid with the ability to better sense the occurrence of destabilizing events and respond with corrective action is a large step forward, it does not neutralize the threat of IMDs. An expanded conception of the nature of threats to critical infrastructure is in order, which includes a wider consideration of the means available to bolster resilience. One option is to consider how carefully we monitor the distribution and sale of IMD components, akin to current efforts to track the movement of IED precursors. Such efforts bear similarity to the product recall functions of federal agencies like the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), who are responsible for implementing recalls of food, drugs, and other consumer products that pose a threat to citizens' health and safety. In the first quarter of 2014 alone the FDA managed 553 food, pharmaceutical, and medical device recalls (Quarter 1 Recall, 2014) yet the CDC estimates that on a yearly basis, contaminated food kills 3,000 people and sickens another 48 million (Cascone et al., 2013) so recalls are not a perfect defense against contamination. While recall efforts have proved daunting in the past, the advent of collaborative big data analytics and high performance computing could offer new insights and avenues for tracking items of interest and intervening to mitigate against harm (Wynn et al., 2011) .
Similarly, CIP could leverage collaborative big data analytics to identify potentially malicious actors. Much like the Coplink system used to such great effect amongst law enforcement agencies (Hauck et al., 2002 ) the ability to assimilate data from various sources about individuals whose behavior and public statements suggest they pose a threat to critical infrastructure could be relayed to appropriate authorities for further investigation or action. Incident reports or other records of an individual caught attempting to access critical infrastructure facilities without clearance, making unofficial inquiries about critical infrastructure systems without a demonstrably legitimate purpose, or making public statements regarding threats to critical infrastructure would feed into an alert system integrated with existing critical infrastructure information systems. Should an individual's behavior raise sufficient suspicion as determined by an established fact management framework, red flags would trigger action on the part of appropriate authorities. As Coplink has become the -google for cops‖, and proven effective at data integration and knowledge management for decision support (Hu et al., 2011) so too could such a mechanism support CIP.
CONCLUSION
The complexity of modern critical infrastructure systems is both an asset and a liability. The increasing reliance on sophisticated technology enables more efficient operation, yet also leaves systems vulnerable to attack and cascading failure. Technology is central to nearly every aspect of our personal and professional lives, and so the electric grid that powers such technology must operate constantly without disruption. However, the grid does not operate in a vacuum and an increasingly large set of variables affect its reliable operation. A grid system whose sole defense is the physical hardening of its key components against external threats is brittle, and only as secure as its most vulnerable component. CIP efforts will benefit from an expanded defense paradigm that also includes mechanisms to increase collective internal resilience of the system as a whole, particularly the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Just as the Maginot Line was circumvented by invading German forces, so too can protective measures in an electric grid system be compromised if they do not readily adapt to address an evolving threat. Similarly, endeavors to prevent the sale of alcohol or the production of IEDs demonstrate the challenge of achieving prevention amongst actors who are willing and able to develop subversive tactics. In light of such historical examples, it is clear that protecting the electric grid against a threat like IMDs is a significant challenge that requires attention.
In order to build a more resilient electric grid, we must find new methodologies for discovering and analyzing the complex web of variables that have the potential to disrupt the grid's normal function, and architect a comparably robust set of protections to mitigate them. The interdisciplinary nature of Sensemaking is ideally suited to meet such a challenge, in that this methodology incorporates a variety of perspectives, in order to gain deep insight into the nature of complex systems, thus illuminating viable decision pathways for strengthening the defense of systems. While rapid advances in technology undeniably change the landscape of modern society, the ability to incorporate lessons from past experience will help to ensure technological change can be translated into sustainable progress.
Just as modern civilization developed the skyscraper through the union of the architect's artistic vision and the builder's practical know-how, we can achieve more resilient critical infrastructure systems by uniting the art of human ingenuity and insight with the science that powers the grid and other related systems. Collaborative big data analytics offers the capability to understand the persistent challenge of vulnerable critical infrastructure from a new vantage point.
By offering the possibility of synthesizing, in real time, a virtually infinite range of information relevant to the operation of the grid, from weather and seismic data indicating the condition of the physical environment, to human-generated content, this methodology offers new insights to inform resilient and sustainable operating archetypes. We look forward to exploring these concepts more deeply in future work and demonstrating the value of Sensemaking as a methodology.
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